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Now, to set the stage for the speakers, I want to remind you that when
the International Monetary Fund was founded in 1944, "the Treaty
establishing the Fund could be viewed as an adjunct to the attempt to
restore the world's open international trading system which had completely
foundered during the 1930's and the subsequent World War."' The idea
that lay behind the International Monetary Fund Agreement, which is
setting out the rules governing trading in currencies and sets up a fund to
make short-term loans to countries that have currency crises, was that
exchange controls on payments for goods and services were another barrier
to free trade. Thus, the rules of the Fund Agreement forbidding, for
countries accepting the obligations of convertibility, the imposition of
exchange controls without the approval of the Fund, apply only to
"restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current
international transactions" and do not have any application to exchange
controls that countries maintain over the use of their currencies in the
capital markets. The Fund was set up as the overseer of the removal of
exchange controls that interfere with free movement of goods and services.
It was not given any jurisdiction over the use by countries of exchange
controls on capital movements.
The history of the British economist John Maynard Keynes' role in the
drafting of these provisions and his views on why capital movements
should not be liberalized are very well set out in an article by John Cassidy
called The New World Disorder. It was simply assumed by Keynes and by
the founders of the Fund that countries would deal with balance of payment
difficulties occasioned by capital outflows with capital controls. Indeed
Article VI of the Fund Agreement provides, "[a] member may not use the
Fund's resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital ...and
the Fund may request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use of
the resources of the Fund."
In the early 1970's, however, the international community and the
Fund began to change its collective view concerning the evils of capital
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controls. One of Margaret Thatcher's first actions as a free marketeer
Prime Minister of Britain was to remove the United Kingdom's exchange
controls on capital flows. The OECD, the club of western industrial
nations, produced its Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, and the
European Community included among its rules for achieving a single
market the freedom of movement of capital. It appears to be accepted by
most free market economists that if the removal of barriers to the free
movement of goods and services demonstrably increases the general
welfare, this should also prove true for freedom of capital movements. By
the 1990's, the Fund's and the World Bank's Joint Development
Committee was attempting to ensure that developing countries had
maximum access to international capital markets and the Fund itself was
including in its programs for borrowing countries the condition (among
many others) that they liberalize their capital accounts. In July 1997, The
Interim Committee, the Fund's top governing Committee, recommended
amendment of the Fund Agreement to provide as one of the purposes of the
Treaty the liberalization of capital accounts.
The speakers will now continue for you the story of the international
community's interest in asserting some sort of international oversight over
capital flows.
